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Works and Services Abstract 
This paper evaluates the usefulness of a currency board regime based on Argentina’s 
experience.  Argentina adopted the currency board in March 1991 to put an end to a 
long history of large macroeconomic imbalances and high inflation that culminated in 
the hyperinflation process of 1989-91.  The regime has been extremely successful in 
restoring macroeconomic stability and ensuring low inflation.  The adoption of a tight 
fiscal stance, and of sound polices to strengthen the financial system were critical to 
ensure the resilience of the economy to respond to adverse external shocks. 
The paper will argue that a strict exchange rate rule like the one used in 
Argentina can be a strong alternative to other exchange rate regimes to ensure 
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 1. Introduction 
   
 The recent turmoil in international capital markets has generated an 
unprecedented degree of volatility in exchange rates and domestic interest rates.  
Devaluations in emerging countries were the prelude to a period of high volatility, 
where sharp increases in interest rates failed to avoid an uncontrolled collapse of the 
currency.  Foreign exchange crises were usually accompanied by banking crises and 
problems to service private and public sector debt.  As a result of this turmoil many 
emerging market economies suffered deep recessions.  The severity of these crises has 
started a debate about their causes and about policies that can help to avoid them. 
 While there is an ongoing debate among economists and policy makers about the 
ability of alternative exchange rate regimes to deal with this type of crises in a 
globalized world, there are signs that the debate is converging to two main alternatives: 
freely floating exchange rates or currency boards. 
 Argentina is one of the few countries that has had a successful currency board in 
place for a number of years.  The currency board was adopted in April 1991 in response 
to one of the worst inflation track records since the sixties that culminated in the 
hyperinflation of 1989.  Since its adoption, Argentina has experienced one of the most 
remarkable turnarounds in economic performance and has managed to overcome three 
large external shocks (the tequila effect, the East Asian crisis and the Russian default).   
The convertibility plan has been extremely effective in restoring price stability 
and growth.  Few countries experienced such a dramatic improvement in a short time.  
Table 1 shows the significant change in performance between the eighties, the decade of 
the debt crisis, and the nineties, the time when the currency board has been in place in 
Argentina.  Inflation fell from more than 600% in the eighties to international levels in 
the nineties, while economic growth experienced a sharp reversal from an average 
contraction in GDP of 1.1 percent in the eighties to an increase of 5.8 percent in output 
in the nineties.  And the country has attracted a large pool of foreign direct investment, 
improve productivity growth as well as its export performance.  It is clear that today 
Argentina enjoys a healthy economic environment with low inflation and high growth, 
has one of the strongest financial systems among emerging markets and has put in place 
a set of  “defensive” policies that limits the vulnerability to volatile capital flows. 
  
Table 1: 






































* Excluding proceeds from privatizations 
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The currency board was a key component of the so-called convertibility plan, an 
innovative and comprehensive stabilization program to eliminate inflation, and restore 
macroeconomic balance and long term growth.  The program was based on a strict 
exchange rate rule, where the parity was fixed by law at one peso per US dollar.  In 
addition, the convertibility law established that the monetary base had to be fully 
backed by international reserves, while the central bank was restrained from financing 
budget deficits, thus breaking one of the critical mechanisms that caused inflation in the 
past.  In effect, Argentina established a currency board regime. 
The convertibility plan combined strict monetary and fiscal discipline with far 
reaching structural reforms.  The fiscal balance could only be ensured through a 
comprehensive transformation of the public sector, including privatization of public 
sector enterprises, a reduction in public employment, and tax and social security 
reforms.  The monetary and exchange rate discipline was ensured through the 
convertibility law and the independence of the central bank.  Finally, the government 
introduced a package of far reaching structural reforms to restore long-term growth, 
including the de-regulation of the economy, a reduction in import tariffs and in 
restrictions to international trade, the liberalization of capital flows including foreign 
direct investment, and the restructuring of the financial sector.  The new set of prudential regulations for the financial sector were critical, 
especially because under a currency board the central bank is restricted to act as lender 
of last resort.  Thus, the central bank imposed prudential regulations that ensured 
adequate levels of capital and liquidity, exceeding the standards for industrialized 
countries as set in the Basle agreements.  
The success of the convertibility arrangement in Argentina has attracted 
significant attention, especially following the collapse of many alternative exchange rate 
arrangements.  Perhaps more interesting, the success of the convertibility plan has been 
maintained through periods of large external turmoil, such as the Mexican devaluation 
of 1994, the so called tequila effect, the East Asian crisis and the Russian default.  More 
recently, the economy is responding remarkably well to the Brazilian devaluation, 
reinforcing the view that a currency board is a strong regime in a world of large 
financial shocks. 
What makes a currency board such a strong regime in a globalized world?  Is the 
Argentine experience unique or are there lessons that could be useful to other countries?  
How important is the strength of the banking system in this type of regime?  Can a 
currency board overcome a banking crisis and how?  Where lies the vulnerability of this 
type of regime and what can be done to limit its impact?  These are some of the 
questions that will be addressed in this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will briefly look at the most 
relevant aspects of the Argentina’s inflationary history prior to the Convertibility Plan, 
show that its origins were linked to large budget deficits and discuss the many 
unsuccessful attempts to control of inflation in the past.  Section 3 analyzes the reasons 
for the success of the convertibility plan and the key elements that distinguished this 
program from previous failed ones.  It discusses the structural policies implemented to 
strengthen the fiscal accounts and to improve the overall macroeconomic performance 
as well as the rules under which the currency board operated.  Section 4 will describe 
the impact of the Mexican devaluation on Argentina and the threat it imposed on the 
Convertibility plan and to the banking system.  Section 5 discusses some of the policy 
measures that were undertaken in the aftermath of the Mexican devaluation while 
section 6 looks at their effectiveness to allow Argentina overcome the financial crises of 
the late nineties.  We conclude in Section 7 with some reflections about the usefulness 
of currency boards in today’s globalized markets.  2. Inflation and Stabilization in Argentina 
 
Argentina has a long inflationary history going back to the forties. In the fifties 
and sixties, the rate of inflation was around a 30% per year, while in the seventies it was 
consistently above 100% per year, with a significant increase in the second half of the 
decade (table 2).  By the beginning of the eighties, inflation rose again, and by the 
middle of the decade it exceeded 600% per year.  In spite of the secular increase in 
inflation over time, the governments managed to keep it under limited control till the 
mid-eighties, avoiding an explosive path of the inflationary process.  While inflation did 
not get fully out of control, it moved in steps to higher and higher levels, and the 
successive stabilization programs when they managed to succeed they stabilized 
inflation always at a higher plateau.  This limited control over inflation corresponds to 









   
1946-50  20.0% 
1951-55  18.1% 
1956-60  38.8% 
1961-65  25.2% 
1966-70  19.1% 
1971-75  104.6% 
1976-80  181.0% 
1981-85  369.6% 
1986-90  1382.4% 
1991-95  22.9% 
1996  0.1% 
1997  0.3% 
1998  0.7% 
 
 
The origin of inflation in Argentina was closely related to the fiscal deficits. This 
can be clearly seen from figure 1, which shows the cycles of inflation and budget 
deficits since the mid-sixties till the present.  The close links between fiscal deficits and 
inflation in the long run are particularly important in the extreme episodes, such as those of 1974-76, 82-85 and 89-91, while the relationship is weaker at times when inflation 





Sources: Carlos Rodríguez, “The Macroeconomics of the Public Sector Deficit. The Case of Argentina”. 
De Pablo, “Macroeconomic policy crisis and long term growth”. “Argentina, from insolvency to growth”, 
A World Bank Country Study, 1993. 
 
Argentina has a long history of stabilization programs to bring down inflation 
(figure 2).  Unfortunately, most of them were short lived.  The success was limited even 
for some of the most comprehensive programs such as the Krieger Vasena plan (1967), 
the “Tablita” program of Martinez de Hoz (1979-81), and the Austral Plan (1985)
2.  In 
the three cases the government adopted an exchange rate based stabilization strategy 
(i.e. using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor) and they succeeded in bringing 
down inflation, at least temporarily.  Moreover, in the three cases there was an initial 
effort to reduce the fiscal deficit.  However, the programs could not be sustained in the 
long run and they all ended in balance of payments crises and “maxi-devaluations” as a 
result of their inability to achieve a sustainable reduction in the fiscal deficit and to have 
                                                         
1 In the short and medium run the dynamics of inflation were much more complicated as they depended 
on fiscal and non-fiscal factors.  These issues are discussed in more detail in Kiguel and Liviatan (1989), 
Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987), Barro and Gordon (1983), among others. 
2 The Program of Krieger Vasena is extensively described in De Pablo (1972), the Austral Plan in Kiguel 
(1991) and the “Tablita” Program of Martinez de Hoz in Ramos (1986). For an extensive discussion of 
the Programs that used the exchange rate as the nominal anchor see Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and Vegh 
(1993). 






















































































 consistent monetary and credit policies. In all cases inflation rekindled and after a few 
years it reached higher levels than prior to the stabilization programs. 
 
 
By the early eighties inflation started to show an upward trend that was only 
slowed down temporarily by several stabilization attempts. Nevertheless, by the late 
eighties inflation was getting out of control and Argentina was clearly on the way to its 
worst inflation episode, a full-blown hyperinflation.  
In fact, the hyperinflation that began in February of 1989 and ended with the 
Convertibility Plan in March 1991 marked a turning point in Argentina’s inflationary 
history. The hyperinflation represented the first episode in which the authorities 
completely lost control over the rate of inflation.  It was no longer possible to reduce the 
inflation rate to stable levels, even if those levels were moderate or high. The 
inflationary process became explosive, and it became apparent that Argentina was no 
longer able to live with inflation. The choices were price stability or hyperinflation. And 
given that an economy can not live under hyperinflation for a long period, there was a 
clear need for a consistent stabilization program to achieve complete price stability. 
After a period in which the authorities attempted unsuccessfully to keep inflation under 
control (the so-called plan Erman) through contractionary monetary policy, they finally 
opted for a fixed exchange rate regime.  































 3. The Convertibility Plan 
 
The convertibility plan was a comprehensive program that combined orthodox 
stabilization policies with far reaching structural reforms to ensure price stability and 
promote long-term growth. These structural policies, adopted since March 1991, were 
introduced to ensure the long run sustainability of the plan.  The program started with a 
handicap, it had to overcome the initial lack of confidence that any new plan would 
confront following decades of high inflation and numerous failed stabilization attempts.  
Generating credibility in the new program was certainly one of the biggest challenges.  
To deal with the of lack of credibility problem, the authorities decided to go one 
step further in the structure of the exchange rate based stabilization programs, and 
adopted a currency board.  Under this regime, the monetary authority is committed to 
back all the monetary liabilities with international reserves and to be ready to exchange 
one peso for one dollar when requested to do so. Thus, the central bank gives up 
monetary policy, as money supply becomes entirely endogenous.  Hume’s endogenous 
adjustment mechanism is under full operation: international reserves are fully 
determined by money demand, and any attempt by the monetary authority to expand 
domestic credit would only generate an equivalent loss of reserves.  Since March 1991, 
changes in the monetary base were primarily determined by changes in international 




                                                         
3 After 1995 there were changes in the definition of the monetary liabilities of the central bank that had to 
be backed by international reserves. In particular, after January 1995 the deposits of financial institutions 
at the Central Bank were denominated in dollars, and therefore technically they could no longer be 
considered as part of the monetary base. However, they still needed to be backed with international 
reserves. At the same time, the creation of the Liquidity Requirements, that took the form of a deposit at 
the Central Bank, and included repos operations and liquidity bills, were also backed by international 
reserves.  
 
3.1 The Monetary Regime 
 
The Convertibility Law and the Charter of the Central Bank included a number 
of constraints aimed at enhancing the credibility of the new regime.  Among the most 
important ones were the following:   
i.  The Central Bank became independent: the monetary authorities were 
empowered with independence of the incumbent political party. 
ii.  The exchange rate between the peso and the US dollar was set by law, the 
Convertibility Law, and the foreign exchange rate market was fully 
liberalized. This implied that any change in the nominal exchange rate had to 
be approved by Congress, imposing a constraint on the central bank and the 
ministry of economics to unilaterally deviate from the announced policy. 
iii.  The convertibility law established that the monetary base had to be fully 
backed by international reserves. Up to one third of the backing of the 
monetary base could be in liquid, government bonds, denominated in foreign 
currency, and valued at market prices
4.  
iv.  The law also restrained the central bank from financing any fiscal deficit, 
except through the purchase of government bonds at market prices. The 
                                                         
4 For the first board of the central bank authorities there was an especial provision that restricted the 
proportion of public bonds so that they could not exceed twenty percent of total reserves. 
Figure 3

































































































 increase in holdings of government bonds by the Central Bank could not 
exceed 10% per year. 
v.  All contracts were allowed to be expressed in dollars, but the law prohibited 
the inclusion of indexation clauses to avoid the effects of inflation inertia. 
vi.  Free capital mobility was established. There were no controls on any type of 
foreign exchange transactions between residents and non-residents.  
 
Several remarks are in order.  First, in the Argentine currency board arrangement 
the central bank can back a fraction of the monetary base with government bonds, thus 
providing some flexibility to the monetary authority to perform monetary or credit 
policies.  As long as the fraction of bonds used to back the monetary base is lower than 
its upper limit, there is some room for expanding central bank domestic credit. This 
limited flexibility enables the Central Bank to expand credit to financial institutions if 
there is a systemic liquidity shortage and hence act as lender of last resort.  This 
instrument became important in exceptional circumstances; such as during the financial 
crisis that took place after the Mexican devaluation of December 1994. 
Second, it was crucial to eliminate the quasi-fiscal deficit, whose main origin 
was the payment of interest on the financial institution’s reserve requirements.  While 
the central bank was remunerating its liabilities it did not earn interest on its assets to 
generate a compensating revenue stream. When the central bank stopped the 
remuneration of reserve requirements, it ended all subsidized credits to the private 
sector and eliminated the mechanisms of exchange rate insurance, it removed the 
sources of one of the key factors that led to the failure of the stabilization programs in 
the past.  
Third, under this monetary regime the central bank has only a limited ability to 
act as lender of last resort, as it only has few monetary instruments to manage the 
liquidity of the financial system in the short run; such as repos and reverse repos
5 with 
government bonds, or rediscounts to financial institutions when they face transitory 
liquidity problems. Finally, the central bank can manage systemic liquidity through 
changes in reserve requirements.  
                                                         
5 The word “repos” refers to repurchase agreements with government bonds -spot purchase and future 
sale of public bonds- while reverse repos to the inverse transaction -spot sale and future purchase of 
public bonds. To summarize, Argentina enjoys the advantages of a currency board to ensure 
discipline while it maintains appropriate instruments to enable the central bank to act as 
lender of last resort.  This monetary regime has been extremely useful during times of 
external shocks to generate credibility in the exchange rate regime while maintaining 
flexibility to overcome financial crises. 
 
3.2 The fiscal Adjustment 
 
At the heart of the convertibility plan was the need to attain fiscal balance.  It 
was achieved thanks to a series of structural reforms that enhanced public sector 
finances including changes in the tax system, -giving more importance to the value 
added tax and the profits tax-, the privatization of public enterprises, the reform of the 
social security system, and a large reduction in public sector employment.  Thanks to 
these policies the budget deficit was reduced from 10% of GDP in 1989 to a balanced 
position in the first half of the nineties.  In addition, around 800,000 public servants left 
the public sector, both through attrition and the privatization of public sector 
enterprises. 
The Social Security reform was perhaps one of the most important ones. The old 
pay as you go system, in which the federal government collects taxes to finance pension 
payments, was replaced by a capitalization scheme in which each worker contributes to 
an individual account to fund its future retirement.  This reform has been useful for the 
development of the domestic capital market while it improved the long-term fiscal 
accounts.  
The privatization of public sector enterprises was another building block of the 
fiscal adjustment, because a large portion of the budget deficit resulted from losses in 
their operations.  The privatization process has been comprehensive including all 
industrial enterprises (such as the airline, and the oil company among others), all 
utilities and even operations such as ports, the postal services, the airports, the trains, 
the subways and the highways.  The benefits were twofold: they improved the fiscal 
accounts at the same time that there was a significant improvement in the efficiency of 
the services which in many instances was critical for improvements in total productivity 
in the economy,  
 The consolidation of the fiscal accounts was ensured through a new set of tax 
revenues that reduced the inefficiencies of the previous structure.  Before the nineties the government obtained most of its revenues from highly distortionary sources such as 
export taxes and the inflation tax.  These taxes were replaced by the broader value 
added tax as well as more revenues from income taxes. 
 Finally, the government passed a law to consolidate old debts from suppliers and 
pensioners in order to avoid a constant flow of expenditures.  In fact, the public sector 
was facing large, and sometimes unpredictable expenditures from lost lawsuits.  The 
size of these expenditures was so large that they posed a threat to fiscal stability.  To 
deal with this issue, the consolidation law of August 1991 established that those debts 
that corresponded to events that occurred prior to April 1991 were to be paid in a 
“consolidation” bond with a maturity of up to sixteen years depending on the type of 
debt. 
 
3.3 Financial Reform and the Capital Market 
  
 A key element of the reform process was a major restructuring of the banking 
sector aimed at improving its solvency and hence reducing the risks of possible bank 
bailouts.  The banking crises of the late seventies and early eighties generated fiscal 
losses that analysts estimate to have reached between of 10% and 15% of GDP.  To 
avoid the recurrence of this type of problem the central bank embarked on the task of 
developing a new set of prudential regulations that emphasized adequate capitalization 
and liquidity, at the same time that it worked on strengthening the superintendency of 
banks to ensure compliance as well as early detection of bank problems.    
The new charter of the central bank and the convertibility law limited the 
amount of assistance that the central bank could provide to financial institutions, in 
effect reducing the chances of new fiscal losses emerging from the banking sector.  In 
addition, the central bank was not allowed to pay interest on reserve requirements, an 
important decision to avoid quasi-fiscal deficits while it signaled a clear break from the 
destabilizing policies of the past. 
Based on the Basle Committee’s recommendations, the authorities implemented 
a system of capital requirements that depended on the credit risk of the different assets.  
But in Argentina the system is stricter, as the required capital/assets at risk ratio was 
fixed at 11.5%, a level that is substantially higher than the 8% ratio recommended by 
the Basle Committee.  In addition, in Argentina these capital requirements were adjusted based on the interest rate charged on each loan. The higher the interest rate, the 
greater the presumed risk involved and hence the larger the capital requirements.   
Two additional factors influenced the capital needs of banks.  First, they 
depended on the overall rating that the superintendency of financial institutions assigned 
to each bank, which is based its performance (the so-called CAMEL system).
6  Second, 
the central bank increased the capital requirements to deal with market risk, in other 
words the risk associated with changes in prices of securities that are traded in 
organized markets. 
 The objective of this regulatory framework was to ensure the strength of the 
banking system and not to limit competition.  In fact, the regulations promoted 
competition in a free market environment by eliminating entry restrictions to the 
banking industry, facilitating mergers and acquisitions, putting domestic and foreign 
banks on equal footing, while allowing interests rates on deposits and loans to be market 
determined.  
A key element to ensure access to the international capital markets was to 
renegotiate the foreign debt that remained in arrears since the default of the early 
eighties.  This was achieved through a Brady-type agreement with external creditors, by 
which the old debts could be exchange for three alternative bonds.  The options 
included the Par (fixed rate) and Discount (floating rate) bonds, with a final maturity of 
thirty years and where the principal was guaranteed by a zero coupon US treasury bond, 
and a ten year Floating Rate Bond (FRB) without any type of collateral.  The successful 
completion of the Brady agreement opened the way for new voluntary financing in the 
international capital markets and has allowed Argentina to issue new bonds regularly in 
Dollars, European currencies and Yens.  
                                                         
6 CAMEL stands for credit, assets, management, earnings and liquidity, and it is an acronym that 
represents an international standard that most central banks use to rate banks.  
 4. The results of the Convertibility Plan 
 
4.1 The Initial Results  
The Convertibility Plan has been the most successful stabilization program 
implemented in Argentina.  In just two years, inflation fell from 171 percent per year in 
1991 to 10 percent in 1993 and to only 4.7 percent in 1994.  No other stabilization plan 
in any country suffering a process of chronic inflation had reduced the rate of inflation 
to international levels so fast in a sustained way.  For example, the successful 
stabilization process that began in Chile in the seventies, when the inflation was 
approximately 500 percent per year, only achieved a reduction in the rate of inflation to 
levels of 20 percent per year. Today, after two decades of conservative macroeconomics 
policies, the rate of inflation is still above the international levels. 
The program enjoyed much more credibility than previous stabilization attempts 
in Argentina. This can be easily seen from the behavior of the interest rate after the plan 
was launched in 1991.  Figure 4b shows the spread between the returns in pesos and 
dollars during the Convertibility Plan.  As can be seen, the spread fell very fast and at 
the early stages of the plan.  This fall in the spread compares favorably with the 
convergence observed during the Tablita Plan in the late seventies. While in the case of 
the Convertibility Plan the gap was falling fast and continued on its declining path over 
time, in the 1979 plan (figure 4a) the spread showed very pronounced cycles, growing 
at the beginning and then falling, to finally grow up again in anticipation of the 
abandonment of the program. Moreover, such a differential generally exceeded 1.5 
percent per month, thus maintaining levels well above the international rates. On the 
contrary, during the Convertibility Plan the spread reached a level of only 1% per year.  The fall in the rate of inflation produced a fast re-monetization of the economy. 
During the hyperinflation, the economy suffered an important reduction in the monetary 
aggregates as a result of the high costs of maintaining assets denominated in local 
currency. As a result, M1 fell to just three percent of GDP. The broadest monetary 
aggregate, M3
7, reached levels of only five percent of GDP, as can be seen in figure 5. 
This declining trend in the monetary aggregates was reversed after the implementation 
of the Convertibility Plan.  Inflation was under control, and as agents became more 













                                                         
7 M3 is defined as the sum of currency in circulation and total deposits, both in pesos and dollars. 
Fig. 4 a & b: Fig. 4 a & b:


































By 1994, the economy had recovered the levels of monetization that prevailed 
during the eighties, and M3 reached again a level of 17 percent of GDP. An important 
characteristic of this monetization was the growth of the deposits denominated in 
dollars, the “argendollars”.  These deposits existed since the mid-eighties, but they only 
became important with the Convertibility Plan.  As can be seen in figure 6, dollar 
deposits showed the fastest rate of growth within total deposits, reaching 50% in 1994.  
During this period there was a strong trend toward a dollarization of time deposits, as 
they reached 70 percent of total time deposits, while checking and savings accounts, 
those demanded for transactional purposes were maintained mostly in pesos. 
 
Figure 6:


































































































































































































































8The growth in deposits was accompanied by a growth in local credit. The 
financial system was subject to high reserve requirements, and therefore the credit 
multiplier was relatively low (around 1.5).
8  The high reserves requirements, initially 
developed as a precautionary device, were useful in practice to moderate the 
expansionary effects of the strong capital inflows as well as the growth in economic 
activity and the real exchange rate appreciation. 
The monetary expansion took place along with an important growth in economic 
activity.  During the early stage of the convertibility plan the Argentine economy 
experienced one of the fastest growth ever, as GDP grew at an average rate of seven 
percent per year between 1991 and 1994.  This growth was consistently accompanied 
by an investment boom, as it increased from 13.2 percent of GDP in 1990 to 22 percent 
in 1997. Consumption showed a boom-bust cycle path, typical of a stabilization 
program based on the exchange rate. Initially, the growth rate of consumption exceeded 
those of production, but since 1993 this trend was reversed and the opposite behavior 




Macroeconomic Indicators 91-95 
 










             
1991  10,6%  14,8%  29,9%  84,0%  N/A  -3,0% 
1992  9,6%  13,2%  32,6%  17,5%  -2,4%  3,5% 
1993  5,7%  5,3%  15,3%  7,4%  -3,0%  7,0% 
1994  8,0%  6,7%  20,7%  3,9%  -3,6%  20,8% 
1995  -4,0%  -5,8%  -16,0%  1,6%  -1,0%  32,1% 
             
 
 
There was a deterioration of the current account during this period, along with a 
strong capital inflow and a balance of payments surplus which resulted in a significant 
accumulation of international reserves.  The deterioration in the current account mainly 
resulted from a large increase in consumption and investment from renewed confidence 
in the economy that was now financed to a greater extent by foreign savings. In 
                                                         
8 Reserve requirements in 1994 were 43 percent for checking and savings accounts, and 3 percent for time 
deposits of less than three months. addition, the privatization process attracted foreign investors, and deregulation had 
stimulated investments in many markets.  Besides, this expansion was typical of an 
exchange rate based stabilization plan
9.  But there were also external elements 
explaining this cycle, such as the historically low levels of the international interest 
rates, that produced an inflow of capital all over Latin-America, and the change of the 
perception of foreign investors regarding the policies followed in the region
10. 
 However, and in contrast to previous failed stabilization attempts, the current 
account deficit never showed unsustainable levels.  Between 1992 and 1994 it was 
around 3.5 percent of GDP, while exports showed a good performance, especially since 
1995. Moreover, Argentina never faced problems in financing its external deficit, given 
that capital inflows were higher than the deficits referred. 
In summary, during the first four years of the Convertibility Plan the Argentine 
economy showed a healthy transition to its long run equilibrium, with high rates of 
growth of GDP, increasing rates of investment and domestic savings, low rates of 
inflation and interest rates in a sustained convergence to international levels, and a 
growth in exports that became more important over time. 
 
 
4.2. The Convertibility Plan during the Tequila Effect 
The Mexican devaluation of December 20, 1994 shocked the Argentine 
economy strongly, and constituted one of the biggest challenges for the convertibility 
plan. The economy suffered an important outflow of private capital, especially of short-
term nature.  International reserves fell by 6 billion dollars (or 33 percent) between 
December 1994 and March 1995 posing a large test on the exchange rate rule. 
 The financial system suffered a sudden loss of near 18 percent of total deposits 
in only four months, as can be observed in figure 7a.  There are few cases in the history 
of financial crises of shocks of this magnitude.  In the great depression in United States 
during the thirties, banks lost 35 percent of their deposits, but this occurred over a four 
years period. The financial crisis in Argentina was particularly difficult to manage 
because the monetary authority faces constraints to act as lender of last resort.  As a 
                                                         
9 Kiguel and Liviatan (1991) present the stylized facts of these kind of stabilization programs. Calvo and 
Vegh (1990) present a discussion of some possible theoretical explanations for such a consumption boom. 
10 The capital inflows to Latin-America in the 90`s are analyzed in Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart 
(1993). result, the Central Bank could not always provide the necessary liquidity to financial 
institutions facing transitory problems. 
Even under these extreme circumstances, the convertibility plan proved to be 
strong enough to survive the situation.  The country experienced an immediate 
improvement in the current account of the balance of payments, thanks to the growth of 
exports of approximately 45 percent and a reduction in the level of imports of 10 
percent.  Moreover, this improvement was achieved without devaluing the currency. 
The balance of payments also improved, as can be observed by the evolution of the 
international reserves (figure 7b), that grew over 2.000 millions of dollars between 
March -the most critical moment of the crisis- and October of that year. 
 
The financial crisis was also successfully managed.  The eight billion dollars in 
deposits lost by the financial system as result of the crisis were recovered completely by 
early 1996, and by October 1997, before the Asian crisis, total deposits reached a level 
of 65 billion dollars (compared with 45 billion prior to December 1994).  Interest rates, 
both in pesos and dollars, returned smoothly to pre-tequila levels (Figure 8), and credit 
to the private sector was completely reestablished after a year. True, the financial 
system suffered the bankruptcy of some banks.  It has to be stressed that even in with no 
Fig. 7 a & b: Fig. 7 a & b:


























Dic-95deposit insurance system, neither implicit nor explicit, depositors only lost around 130 




In addition, and in contrast to most other financial crises, the fiscal costs of the 
banking failures were relatively small. Central bank estimates indicate that the cost to 
taxpayers was 0.2% of GDP, a small number if one compares it with the cost of 
previous banking crises in Argentina (e.g. 10% of GDP in 1981-83) or with 
international experiences, such as Chile in the early eighties (19.6% of GDP), or 
Mexico and Venezuela more recently where some analysts have estimated the costs to 
be around 12% of GDP). 
Even under those extreme circumstances the central bank was able to manage 
the crisis without any deviation from the convertibility law.  At all times, the whole 
monetary base was backed with international reserves. The monetary authority provided 
rediscounts to the financial institutions facing liquidity problems always within the 
limits established by the law.  To back the issuance of domestic currency for this 
purpose, the central bank relied on the excess international reserves (primarily 
constituted by government bonds) that it had accumulated prior to the crisis. This 
episode showed the importance of excess international reserves, as they generate a 
                                                         
11 Recall that the deposit insurance explained in section 3.2 was launched after the Mexican Crisis, in 
May 1995. 


















































































































































































































5cushion that allows the central bank to act as lender of last resort in extreme 
circumstances. 
The crisis had significant real effects, as GDP declined by 4.4 percent in 1995. 
Consumption, and especially investment, were also severely affected as they 
respectively fell by 5.8 and 16.0 percent. But the economy started to recover soon, and 
in 1996 the GDP grew 4.8 percent, while consumption and investment grew by 6.1 and 
8.8 percent, respectively.  The biggest toll of the recession was a dramatic increase in 
unemployment, which reached 18.4 percent in May 1995 (compared with 12.2 percent 
in October 1994) 
 
 
4.3 The banking system during the Mexican crisis  
The financial crisis in Argentina was very intense but the most critical period 
only lasted three months.  The banking system and the fixed exchange rate faced the 
most severe test between December 1994 and March 1995, as the outflow of deposits 
threaten the viability of many banks while the central banks lost significant international 
reserves and allowed interest rates to rise to defend the parity of the peso.  The panic 
ended in mid-March in response to a large adjustment package implemented with the 
support of the IMF, but the decline in deposits did not fully stop awaiting the result of 
the presidential elections of mid-May. Finally, following the re-election of president 
Menem there was a strong and continuous increase in deposits and renewed confidence 
in the domestic currency.
12   By the end of 1995 the financial situation had fully 
stabilized.   
During the three months of the banking crisis the situation deteriorated over 
time.  After a continuous but manageable loss of around 4 billion pesos of deposits 
between December 1994 and February 1995, the outflow of deposits accelerated in 
early March.  By then, the bank run had reached crises levels, with short-term interest 
rates exceeding 60% and deposits falling by more than 4 billion pesos in less than two 
weeks.  Moreover, during that period there was an increase in the degree of dollarization 
of deposits. 
 Initially, the loss of deposits was concentrated on a small group of wholesale 
banks, with large operations in government bonds.  These banks suffered an important 
                                                         
12 The impact of the Tequila effect on the Financial System is analyzed in the Monetary and Financial 
Bulletin of the Central Bank of Argentina, June and July of 1995. reduction in the value of their assets as bond prices collapsed.  Although some funds left 
the banking system, many depositors just moved their funds out of the weakest banks 
looking for a safer location, and an important volume of money was transferred to the 
foreign and the large domestic banks.  At the same time, there was a dollarization of 
deposits.  Up to this point the whole effect was merely a portfolio shift in search for 
“quality”.  However, as that process evolved, there was a “contagion” effect within the 
financial system and more banks started to face an outflow of deposits.   It first affected 
the smaller institutions, especially the cooperative banks, but it later spread to the whole 
financial system.  By March no sector was immune to the crisis, including foreign 
banks, public banks, and the large domestic banks. 
What explains the seriousness and depth of the Argentine banking crisis?  At the 
macroeconomic level there were questions about the sustainability of the convertibility 
arrangement and the fixed exchange arrangement following the Mexican devaluation.  
But in Argentina, there were additional factors that probably prompted the outflow of 
deposits such as the limited ability of the central bank to act as lender of last resort, the 
lack of deposit insurance, and the memories of the forced restructuring of deposits of 
late 1989. 
The lack of a lender of last resort was an institutional factor that probably 
contributed to the panic. As explained, the central bank’s ability to expand domestic 
credit was limited by the stock of excess reserves -that is, those reserves not used to 
back the monetary liabilities
13. Before the crisis, the stock of excess reserves was 1.8 
billion dollars, equivalent to 4% of total deposits and 18% of the fall in total deposits 
that took place during the period.  
 An additional factor that complicated the management of the crisis were the 
memories about the forced restructuring of deposits of late 1989, the so called plan 
Bonex.  At that time the government exchanged deposits in the banking system for 10 
year dollar denominated bonds.  These bonds immediately traded at a large discount 
inflicting a heavy loss to depositors.  As economic agents were probably worried about 
the possibility of a new forced deposit rescheduling to deal with the crisis they acted 
defensively and withdrew funds from the banking system.   
The central bank’s policies during the crisis helped to dampen the impact of the 
decline of deposits on domestic credit.  The loss of deposits of approximately 8.5 billion 
dollars was financed as follows: 1.7 billion with rediscounts from the central bank, four billion with reduction in reserves requirements, 300 million with repos, and one billion 
with foreign credit lines. These figures show that the liquidity instruments of the central 
bank financed 75% of the deposit loss. The difference was financed through a reduction 
in credit to the private sector.  The ability of the monetary authority to manage liquidity 
in the financial system minimized the impact of the crisis on domestic credit. While 
deposits fell by 8.5 billion pesos, credit to the private sector was reduced by only 400 
million, and total credit -including credit to the official sector- fell by 1.1 billion pesos. 
The reversal of the crisis started by mid-March 1995 when the government put 
together a 12 billion-dollar package (equivalent to 4% of GDP) linked to an IMF 
program.  The financing included funding from the multilateral organizations and the 
Eximbank of Japan, the issuance of a “Patriotic Bond” that was purchased by large 
enterprises and banks operating in Argentina, and a 4.5 billion fiscal adjustment –
including resources from privatizations. 
The government created two fiduciary funds to facilitate the adjustment of the 
financial system, one for private and the other for public banks.  These fiduciary funds 
would finance the privatization of provincial banks and provide resources for mergers 
and acquisitions of private banks.  Through these mechanisms the fiduciary funds would 
help the restructuring of the public and private banks facing difficulties. 
Finally, there was a decision to create a privately funded deposit insurance 
system.  The main objective was to protect small depositors who do not have the 
necessary information to discriminate the credit worthiness of various financial 
institutions.  At the same time, the rules were not changed for the larger, more 
sophisticated investors who are in a better position to evaluate the creditworthiness of 
banks who continued to have their deposits at risk. 
 
4.4 Dealing with Failed Banks 
One of the most insightful features of the Argentine banking crisis was the way 
in which the central bank handled bank failures.  In Argentina, large depositors have 
their deposits at risk, and neither the central bank nor the treasury absorb the losses 
resulting from bank failures.  This policy greatly differs from what has become standard 
practice in most countries, and is more similar to the way in which banking crises were 
handled in the past during the so-called free-banking period 
                                                                                                                                                                        
13 The contingent repos. facility program did not exist  at that time, as it became effective in 1997. The main objective of this policy has been to minimize moral hazard problems 
and to reduce the fiscal costs of bank failures.  These costs were extremely large in the 
past in Argentina, and the regime adopted in the early nineties was developed to ensure 
that the old large fiscal loses would not happen again. 
The Argentine legislation established a procedure for dealing with trouble banks 
that is essentially market based and provides some limited privileges to depositors.  If a 
bank faces liquidity problems it can ask for a suspension for up to 90 days.  During that 
period depositors don’t have access to their money and the bank can negotiate with 
large creditors (including some depositors) to agree on longer maturities in order to 
overcome the liquidity problem or try to find additional funds through a merger or 
injections of new capital.  If the process is successful, the bank reopens and continues 
its operations as usual.  If it fails, then the bank is liquidated according to the rules 
established in the law of financial institutions.   
For failed institutions the central bank has generally operated under article 35bis 
of its charter which authorizes the monetary authority to exclude some assets and 
liabilities and transfer them to another “acquiring” institution (see box 1).  In most cases 
this mechanism has allowed almost all depositors to maintain the value of their assets.  
The remainder of the assets is placed in a trust fund and, as in any bankruptcy, the 
proceeds from the sale of these assets are used to cancel other liabilities --mainly 
financial and trade loans, transactions with derivatives and others.  In a few instances, 
however, the assets were not even large enough to cover depositors and hence their 
claims were included in the trust and they also faced loses.  
This system has been effective in Argentina, to limit the government’s costs of 
bank failures while it has reduce moral hazard and risk taking by banks.  Depositors 
have been more selective in choosing the financial institution, as they realized that their 
deposits might not be readily available if the bank were suspended and would be at risk 
if the bank were to fail.  In addition, it has led banks to establish more conservative 
lending policy, as they found out that the central bank would not bail out poorly 
managed institutions. 
To protect small depositors, who do not have adequate information about bank 
risks, the government created a limited, privately funded deposit insurance system in 
April 1995.  The system insured deposits of up to 20,000 pesos or dollars, an amount 
sufficiently large to cover around 75% of depositors (though 25% of total deposits).  
The creation of this system helped to increase the stability of the banking system.  During the period December 1994 and August 1995 the Central Bank 
suspended transitorily fourteen financial institutions, of which three were authorized to 
operate again, three were liquidated, and in other six cases the Central Bank proceeded 
to sell their assets and liabilities (table 4).  By the end of August 1995, only two 
institutions remained suspended
14.  The Central Bank successfully managed the crisis, 
with only less than 1% of depositors actually losing their funds. This is highly 
significant considering the fact that 18% of total deposits were depleted in only four 
months, with no deterioration in public sector finances and only a limited ability of the 




Dec. ´94 – Aug. ´95 
   
   
Banco Extrader S.A.  Revocation 
   
Banco Basel S.A.  Revocation 
   
Banco de Dorrego y Trenque Lauquen S.A.  Revocation; assets and liabilities 
purchased by Banco de La Pampa. 
   
Banco Austral S.A.  Revocation; some assets purchased. 
   
Banco Feigin S.A.  Revocation; assets purchased and a trust 
fund was created. 
   
Banco Integrado Departamental Coop. Ldo. Revocation; assets and liabilities 
purchased and a trust fund was created. 
   
Banco Multicrédito S.A.  Revocation 
   
Finansur S.A.  Reopened 
   
Agentra Compañía Financiera S.A.  Revocation 
   
Créditos Luro S.A.  Revocation; assets purchased 
   
Tarraubella S.A. Compañía Financiera  Revocation 
   
Banco Comercial de Tandil S.A.  Suspended 
   
Banco Federal  Suspended 
   
Banco del Fuerte  Suspended 
 
 
                                                         
14 See the Bulletin of the Central Bank 1995 for more details.  
 
5. The Policy Response to the Tequila 
 
 Despite the success in weathering the effects of the Mexican devaluation, it was 
clear that the government needed to take some additional measures to avoid a repetition 
of this traumatic episode.  In particular, the efforts were concentrated in three areas: i) 
consolidation of the fiscal adjustment, ii) improvement of debt management, iii) 
strengthening the financial sector. 
Although the fiscal performance had improved in the early nineties, there was a 
need to strengthen the fiscal situation as the government was expected to lose in 
revenues in the mid-nineties as a result of the privatization of the pension system, the 
scheduled reduction in labor taxes, the absorption of the provincial social security 
systems, and higher interest payments.  The pension reform inflicted a loss of around 3 
billion dollars in revenues per year, while lower labor taxes from the reduction in 1995 
and 1996 has been estimated to cost at least 500 million pesos per year between 1996 
and 1998.   In addition, the central government absorbed the provincial social security 
systems adding around1.3 billion pesos to deficit in 1997 and 1998. Finally, the 
expenditures between 1996 to 1998 were expected to increase as interest payments on 
old non-interest bearing debt (the so called Bocones) that was accruing approximately 
1.3 billion dollars per year started to be paid, while principal had to be refinance at 
market interest rates.  As can be seen from table 5, these concepts added at least 5 
billion pesos to the deficit per year.  In fact, if one had measured the fiscal deficits on a 
comparable basis, the fiscal situation would have shown a significant improvement 
during this period.  The additional fiscal efforts introduced since1996 explain the 



























           
1990  150        150 
1991  2880        2880 
1992  -1240      200  -1440 
1993  -2210      700  -2910 
1994  1020      1000  20 
1995  3880    1918  1198  764 
1996  6440  771  2470  1170  2029 
1997  4630  1427  3196  767  -760 
1998  4170  1290  3995  531  -1646 




 A second element in the strategy was the improvement in the profile of 
government debt.  This strategy was implemented to reduce the vulnerability that could 
arise from the risks of refinancing that has been one of the key factors for the financial 
crises in Mexico, East Asia, Russia and more recently in Brazil.  Most of the new issues 
were long-term instruments, including 20 and 30 years government bonds, in an effort 
to avoid the concentration of amortizations.  As a result the government has achieved a 
sound maturity structure for its debt without heavy amortizations in the next few years 
(figure 9).  At the same time, the government limited the amount of short-term treasury 
bills, which are widely used elsewhere.  As a result, the average maturity of Argentina’s 
debt today is 7.8 years, while the total amount of short term instruments is just 3.5 




Finally, the central bank established new rules and regulations to strengthen the 
solvency and liquidity of the financial sector.  The banking crisis that followed the 
Mexican devaluation illustrated the importance of systemic liquidity as a substitute for 
the limited ability of the central bank to act as lender of last resort.  The crisis also made 
clear that there was a need to enhance capital requirements and supervision for trading 
activities and holdings of government bonds and the use of derivatives. 
The central bank developed an active policy to improve systemic liquidity.  In 
August 1995 it created the liquidity requirements to replace the existing reserve 
requirements.  The main objective of the new instrument was to ensure that financial 
institutions had adequate resources to confront a possible outflow of deposits.  These 
requirements were increased over time from 16 to 20 percent and they apply to all the 
liabilities of financial institutions, and not just to their deposits (as was the case of 
reserve requirements), while they are calculated based on the residual time to mature as 
opposed to the initial contractual time. 
The negotiation of a contingent credit line between the central bank and private 
international financial institutions was perhaps the most innovative and effective 
measure in this area.  The main objective was to ensure access to foreign currency in the 
event of a crisis in order to back the issuance of domestic currency and hence fulfill its 
Figure 9:

































srole of lender of last resort. This facility gives the monetary authority the option to 
conduct repurchase (repo) operations by selling Argentine public bonds denominated in 
U.S. dollars and receiving the proceeds in dollars
15. This enables the Central Bank to 
obtain dollars and hence to expand domestic credit using the borrowed reserves to back 
the monetary expansion without violating the Convertibility Law.  This instrument that 
originally consisted of an agreement for 6.0 billion dollars was then increased to 6.7 
billion dollars, and more recently to 7.1 billion dollars. 
With the introduction of the liquidity requirements and the contingent credit line 
systemic liquidity reached 30% of total deposits, an amount considered more than 
adequate to overcome any reasonable outflow of deposits in the banking system.  It 
would have been adequate during the Tequila effect, when the banking system lost 18 
percent of deposits in three months.  
The central bank also introduced new rules to exposed banks to market 
discipline, while it issued additional prudential regulations to reduce credit and market 
risk.  Among the most important ones was a requirement for banks to issue an amount 
of subordinated debt equivalent to 2 percent of deposits expecting that the pricing on 
this debt would represent a measure of the bank’s risk.  In effect, the spread over 
government treasuries paid on this debt would provide useful information for both 
depositors and regulators.  This information would be supplemented by new rules 
requiring a credit rating for all banks that would be public information and available to 
all depositors upon request.  The central bank also requested banks to measure the 
market risk for the portfolio of bonds, foreign exchange holdings and derivatives in 
order to assess the possible impact of sudden changes in the prices of these instruments 
while it increased the capital requirements depending on their volatility.  The capital 
requirements were adjusted and generally increased to take into account the market risk. 
                                                         
15 When the transaction matures, the Central Bank repurchases the bonds. These operations have a 
minimum maturity of two years and a maximum of five years. Regarding the margins involved, if the 
prices of the bonds delivered fall by more than 5%, further bonds or dollars must be delivered to reach the 
amount of 125% of the transaction. If the bond prices fall by more than 20%, the Central Bank must 
deliver dollars as margin payments.  
6. Argentina During the Crises of the Late Nineties 
 
The late nineties has been a period of large volatility in emerging markets as a 
result of various foreign exchange and banking crises, starting with the devaluations in 
East Asia, following with the Russian default on its domestic debt, and more recently 
with the devaluation of the real in Brazil.  While the nature of the crisis varied from 
country to country, there seem to be two common elements that underlie these episodes: 
either large short-term private or public foreign debt, or very weak banking systems.  In 
some cases, namely South Korea, the problem was short-term foreign private debt 
coupled with a weak banking system, while in Russia the crisis was triggered by 
difficulties in rolling over an unsustainable amount of domestic currency debt, held to a 
large extent by foreign investors.  
The outbreak of the East Asian crisis occurred on October 22, 1997, with the 
devaluation in South Korea, that had widespread effects among emerging countries.  
While some analysts had been predicting balance of payments difficulties for some of 
these countries, the magnitude of the crises caught most of them by surprise.  Countries 
whose creditworthiness had been perceived as strong, such as South Korea and 
Thailand, were on the verge of default and experienced severe balance of payments 
crises.  Even Hong Kong, a country with a strong commitment to the fixed exchange 
rate regime through its currency board, faced an unsuccessful but significant speculative 
attack on its currency.  The Korean Won plummeted quickly from 800 wons per US 
dollar to 1,800 wons, while the Indonesian Ruppia fell almost 80% within few months 
of the crisis.   
The solution to these crises required significant involvement by the multilateral 
institutions and the G-7 countries.  The IMF took a leading role in putting together the 
financing for the adjustment packages for these countries.  The size of the financial 
assistance was significant, as it reached around 60 billion dollars for Korea, and over 30 
billion for Thailand. 
 The outbreak of the Russian crisis took place on August 17, 1998 when the 
government announced a moratorium on its domestic currency debt.  The Russian 
default had significant effects on the world financial system that went well beyond 
emerging market countries. Banks in Europe and New York experienced large losses as 
a result of their exposure to emerging market countries, and liquidity dried up quickly for most financial instruments. The effects of this crisis spread to the high yield 
instruments of industrialized countries, and caused the failure of many hedge funds.  It 
even forced the New York Fed to lead a bailout of Long-term Capital, a highly 
leveraged hedge fund whose failure would have posed a significant risk to the major 
money center banks.   
The Brazilian devaluation of January 13, 1999, was the last and most recent 
threat, though it has had a much smaller effect on the world financial markets than the 
previous crises. The Real had been under attack since the Russian default, and domestic 
interest rates remained well above sustainable levels.  In the end, the government was 
forced to devalue, and there was concern that this devaluation would lead to a third 
wave of worldwide effects.  This episode, however, did not generate the same type of 
crisis than the previous ones did, in part because it was less unexpected.  Besides, the 
Brazilian authorities managed to control the episode relatively quickly, and by March 
the turbulence was showing strong signs of receding.  
 The impact of these crises on emerging market countries is summarized by the 
evolution of the emerging market bond index (EMBI) prepared by J.P. Morgan (figure 
10).  The Mexican devaluation of 1994 represented the first financial crisis with large 
effects on spreads of emerging market countries, as the EMBI reached almost 1900 
basis points.  The East Asian crisis did imply an increase in spreads, but it was much 
more moderate as the levels remained well below those of the tequila (it peaked at 
around 700 basis points).  The Russian default brought the spreads back to levels 
comparable to those of the tequila (reaching 1700 basis points), while the Brazilian 
devaluation had a much smaller effect. 
 
Figure 10:






























































































































































































































































Argentina faced these three big tests within an eighteen-month period.  The 
spreads on Argentine bonds clearly indicate that the country felt the impact of these 
crises.   During the Russian crisis the spread of the FRB, one of Argentina’s most 
widely used bond, over US treasuries reached levels comparable to those observed in 
the tequila, while financial markets remained closed for several weeks (figure 11).  The 
potential impact of these shocks was large on the Argentine financial system.  With the 




 Nevertheless, Argentina overcame these crises without any significant strain in 
the banking sector neither with any threat to the convertibility regime.  Looking at the 
evolution of deposits it is clear that there was a large difference between the tequila and 
the more recent crises (figure 12).  While in the former total deposits fell by 18 percent, 
in the more recent episodes the banking system did not experience any reduction in 
deposits.  In fact, total deposits increased by around 15% during the East Asian crisis, 
and remained stable or increased at a modest pace during the Russian crisis and the 
Brazilian devaluation. 
 
Fig. 11: Fig. 11:
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This difference in behavior is highlighted by the evolution of domestic interest 
rates and international reserves (Figures 13 and 14). The inter-bank (call) interest rate in 
pesos, that reached 70 percent during the tequila increased only modestly during the 
more recent crises and never exceeded 15 percent.  Likewise, international reserves that 
fell by one third during the Tequila increased continuously during the East Asian crisis 
and stabilized or marginally increased since the Russian default. 
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Jan.´99This strength of the convertibility regime and of the financial system during these crises 
shows a marked difference relative to the tequila.  While Argentina suffered as the 
country risk increased and spreads over treasuries rose to much higher levels, the 
country was successful in insulating the domestic banking system from these events and 
in maintaining full confidence in the convertibility regime.  Why did we observe this 
difference? 
The three sets of policies implemented after the tequila were critical to explain 
the success in weathering the most recent crisis.  For convertibility to succeed it needs a 
sound fiscal position, a well structure amortization schedule for government debt and a 
strong banking system with adequate liquidity.  The government worked on these three 
areas and the policies proved to be successful to overcome the difficult situations.  The 
crises of the nineties were essentially financial crisis, having their origin either in a large 
amount of short-term debt or in weak financial systems.  Argentina worked on 
strengthening these areas and the efforts paid off.    
In addition to the success in maintaining healthy financial indicators, the country 
continued to grow at a strong pace till mid-1998.  In fact, the economy was growing at 
over 7 percent in June 1998  (figure 15).  Nevertheless, the Russian crisis represented a 
turning point for economic growth, as it meant much higher interest rates in the 
international capital markets and sharp tightening in liquidity which included trade and 
financial credit.  In contrast to the tequila, the current recession is not simply the result 
of a tightening in the international capital markets, but it is compounded by low prices 
Fig. 14: Fig. 14:
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1 16 31 46 61for our exports, a strong dollar and a recession in Brazil.  During the tequila, these 
factors provided expansionary effects on GDP. 
 
6.2 The Banking System 
 
 The banking system displayed an excellent performance during the crises of the 
late nineties, as depositors maintained confidence in the system while the indicators of 
financial strength continued to improve.  To a large extent this improvement resulted 
from better regulation and supervision, and from the acquisition or disappearance of the 
weaker banks.   
 In recent years, the Argentine banking sector has attracted the interest of many 
foreign banks that found an opportunity to participate in the potential growth of the 
Argentine financial sector.  Groups such as Banco Santander and Bilbao Biscaya from 
Spain, HSBC, Credit Agricole and Banco ITAU from Brazil among others entered or 
increased their participation in the domestic financial system.  In addition, there were 
many mergers and acquisitions as banks attempted to increase their market share and 
take advantage of economies of scale.  A third factor affecting this concentration was 
the higher capital requirements at a time when raising capital became more difficult due 
to the international situation.   
 The concentration process in the banking system reduced the number of 
financial institutions from 205 in December 1995 to 132 in June 1998.  In addition, 
Figure 15: Figure 15:
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IV-1998there was an important concentration of deposits as the share of the top 20 financial 
institutions increased from 64% to 80% during the same period.  Foreign banks have 
increased significantly their share from 16% in 1994 to 41% in 1998.  Depositors have 
shifted their deposits to these banks, in part as a flight to quality in world where it 
information is costly to obtain and deposit insurance limited. 
 There has been a widespread debate in Argentina regarding the implications of 
this trend.  Some argue that it has been beneficial because the remaining banks are 
stronger and many of the foreign banks would have an easier time securing foreign 
funding if another crisis were to occur, while others expressed concern a credit 
tightening for small and medium enterprises and for regional economies.  The existing 
evidence appears to support both views, as overall liquidity in the banking system has 
remained at very adequate levels, while there seems to be a credit crunch for the sectors 
mentioned above. 
  It is clear that the banking system has become more resilient to shocks during 
this period.  The combination of stronger banks, both foreign and domestic, less public 
banks, more liquidity, better loan portfolios and an improved deposit insurance system 
has helped the banking system to weather the recent crises.  Evidence of the strength of 
the banking system is that although the failures of banks were not completely avoided, 
as more than ten banks failed in the last two years with deposits representing more than 
3% of the total, they did not generate any systemic concerns nor they generated 
contagion.  Depositors now perceive the failure of an individual bank as the result of 
specific problems and do not cast doubts about the solvency and liquidity of the system. 
  7. Conclusion 
 
The convertibility plan has been very successful in Argentina showing that 
currency boards are a viable option.  The currency board was a critical element of the 
policy package that moved Argentina from having one of the highest rates of inflation 
in the world to enjoying today one of the lowest rates, that allowed the country to 
restore high rates of growth after two decades of stagnation and to benefit from more 
stable rules that induced record levels of foreign direct investment. 
Argentina’s currency board has succeeded in a rough international environment, 
with recurrent crises affecting emerging markets.  Evidence of the success has been its 
ability to withstand a number of external shocks, including the Mexican devaluation of 
1994, the Asian crisis, the Russian default and the more recent devaluation in Brazil, 
without any chances in the basic policies. 
The accomplishments of the currency board have required the adoption a set of 
policies that were particularly useful at times of crisis.  Especially important were the 
pursuance of a sound fiscal policy, an adequate term structure of government debt and a 
strong banking system.  The adoption and maintenance of these policies required firm 
determination, because there have been constant pressures to increase the much needed 
government expenditures in human and physical capital, and there has been always 
resistance to increase taxes when it was needed.  Likewise, many of the prudential 
policies for the banking system were criticized as they were perceived as restricting 
credit to the private sector.  But the criticism are based on short term considerations, as 
a country needs fiscal solvency to ensure access to the capital markets, while banks that 
are not perceive to be strong will not gain deposits and hence will not have any money 
to lend. 
One special feature of Argentina has been its approach to handle bank failures.  
The central bank has allowed banks to fail and depositors to lose money.  Some have 
argued that this approach was destabilizing during the tequila, and was one of the 
factors that triggered the bank at that time.  This statement does not seem to be 
supported by the evidence, as Argentine deposits have continuously increased in the 
second half of the nineties, while the failure of banks in recent years were considered to 
be isolated phenomenon without any erosion in confidence.  Besides, and perhaps more 
important, the Argentine tax payer has avoided the costs of poorly managed banks, 
while the policy has increased the quality of bank loans and led to better banks.  There are some economists that believe that Argentina’s successful experience 
with the currency board can serve as a model for other countries.  While this could well 
be true, one needs to take into account that in Argentina the currency board was part of 
a broader policy package, and that it has required strong fiscal and financial discipline 
to rip the benefits from this regime. Box 1: 
 Case study: Banco Patricios 
 
 
In March 1998, the Superintendency of Financial Entities suspended Banco Patricios. 
The Central Bank ordered its reestructuration, under article 35 bis of the Law of 
Financial Institutions. Offers would be received for either: 
a) the purchase of all the shares 
b) the purchase of certain assets and all liabilities 
c) the purchase of certain assets and privileged liabilities 
d) the purchase of certain assets. 
 
Banco Mayo, following alternative c), guaranteed the total return of deposits and kept 
the existing jobs. The offer consisted of: 
a) The purchase of all assets except those in the categories of Intangible Goods, some 
assets under the category of Loans, Other Credits for Financial Intermediation, 
Various goods; and in return it absorbed all the deposits for $331.3 million. 
b) The assumption of “Other Credits for Financial Arbitration” for $4.2 million, 
various labor obligations for $0.27 million and severance payments plus other costs 
for $13 million. 
c) The obligation to comply with privileged labor credits 
d) The creation of two trust funds with certain assets included in the offer 
e) The hiring of some employees of Banco Patricios 
f) The creation of a fund to affect the severance payments 
 
 
The offer and the selection of Banco Mayo had several effects: 
First of all, the bank´s liquidity to cover Banco Patricio´s deposits was well accounted 
for with the contribution made by SEDESA (Deposits Insurance and Guarantee System) 
($125 million) and by the transfers of funds from Banco Patricios. Both added $167 
million which represented 50.6% of the deposits to be transferred ($331.3 million).  
Second, the higher minimum capital requirements due to the purchase of risky assets 
would be covered with Subordinated Debt to be subscribed by the Bank Capitalization 
Fiduciary Fund for $60 million. 
Third, the purchase of a bond issued by a trust fund that holds other credits from the old 
Banco Patricios where Banco Mayo was prefered creditor implied a very low risk for 
the bank.  
Fourth, Banco Mayo’s estimated in $10 million the earnings from the purchase of 
Banco Patricios.  
 
The balance of the final exclusion of assets and liabilities of Banco Patricios to be 
transferred to Banco Mayo:  
Assets  Liabilities 
  Million $    Million $ 
       
Cash  8.31  Deposits  331.28 
Government bonds  9.92  Severance payment  13 
Other Credits  1.58  Other Obligations  3.27 
Shares in other Soc.  6.73     
Various credits  2.52     
Bond A   193.84     
       
SEDESA  124.63     
       




The exclusion implied the transfer of all privileged liabilities for $347.54 million. To 
cover them, the assets excluded were Cash for $8.31 million, Government Bonds for 
$9.92 million, Other Credits for Financial Arbitration for $1.58 million, Shares in other 
Societies for $6.73 million and Various Credits for $2.52 million, which added $29.06 
million. The remaining $318.48 million were covered by trust fund bonds and 
SEDESA.   
 
The other assets of Banco Patricios were transferred to two trust funds, one including all 
the loans and the other real estate properties. These trust funds issued bonds, which 
would be paid with the proceeds from the collection of the loans and the sale of real 
estate. The bonds had two series, one senior (Bond A), subscribed by Banco Mayo, and 
another (Bond B), subscribed by SEDESA, was subordinated to Bond A in terms of 
privilege of collection. 
 
Banco Mayo received Bonds A, fiduciary bonds with privilege of collection, for 
$193.84 million.  
Box 2: 




￿ This contingent line of credit was intended to increase systemic liquidity in the 





￿ This credit line represents about 10% of total deposits. 
￿ The Central Bank has the option to sell Argentine dollar denominated government 
bonds subject to a repurchase clause. 
￿ The contract has been negotiated with top international banks and has a maturity of 
between 2 – 5 years. 
￿ Every three months the program is extended to ensure access to the facility for a 
long enough period. 
￿ The repo has a 20-28% haircut, depending on the security. If the prices of the 
financial instruments fall by more than 5 %, the Central Bank will provide sufficient 
margin to cover 125-140% of the amount of the transaction. 
￿ The repo program has a total amount of U$S 7.2 billion, with U$S 6.7 billion 
coming from government bonds and 0.5 U$S billion from mortgage-backed 
securities. 
￿ There are complementary programs using Argentine mortgages and other assets on 
banks´ balance sheets.  
 
When might it be triggered? 
 
￿ The trigger of the credit line is a very serious liquidity problem in the banking 
sector. 
￿ The repo interest rate is 3 months Libor + 200 bp, and it will be used last, once the 
banks have used other sources of liquidity. 
￿ The crisis must then be a “run” of some 30% of the deposit base or 1
2/3 times the 
size observed during  Tequila. 










Barro, Robert J. (1986). "Inflationary Finance Under Discretion and Rules," Canadian 
Journal of Economics, Vol 16, No.1 January, pp. 1-16. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo,  Leonardo Leiderman and Carmen M. Reinhart (1993). “Capital 
Inflows to Latin America: the Role of External Factors,” IMF Staff Papers 40 (March), 
108-151.   
 
Calvo, Guillermo and Carlos Vegh. (1990). "Credibility and the Dynamics of 
Stabilization Programs: An Analytical Framework," mimeo, IMF. 
 
De Pablo, Juan Carlos. (1972).  Politica Anti-inflacionaria en la Argentina 1967-1970.  
Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores. 
 
Dornbusch, R. and M. Simonsen. (1987). "Inflation Stabilization with Incomes Policy 
Support, A Review of the Experience of Argentina, Brazil and Israel", Group of Thirty, 
New York. 
 
Kiguel, Miguel A. and Nissan Liviatan. (1988).  "Inflationary Rigidities and Orthodox 
Stabilization Policies: Lessons From Latin America," The World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol. 2, No.3, September, pp.273-298. 
 
________________________________. (1991). "The Inflation Stabilization Cycles in 
Argentina and Brazil," in Lessons from Economic Stabilization and its Aftermath, op. 
cit. pp. 191-232. 
 
______________________________________. (1992). "The Business Cycle Associated with 
Exchange Rate Based Stabilization," The World Bank Economic Review, May. 
 
Pazos, Felipe. (1969).  “Medidas para Detener la Inflación crónica en America Latina”, 
Mexico: CEMLA 
 
Ramos, Joseph. (1986). “Neo-conservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America”, 1973-83. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Rodríguez, Carlos Alfredo, (1995). “Ensayo sobre el Plan de Convertibilidad”, CEMA, 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo, N° 105.   
 